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Letter To The Congress - Re: 9/11 And The Truth
Letter To The Congress - Re: 9/11 And The Truth

September 13, 2004

To The Congress of The United States:

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States ended its
report stating that “We look forward to a national debate on the merits of what we have
recommended, and we will participate vigorously in that debate.” In this spirit, we the
undersigned wish to bring to the attention of the Congress and the people of the United
States what we believe are serious shortcomings in the report and its recommendations.
We thus call upon Congress to refrain from narrow political considerations and to apply
brakes to the race to implement the commission recommendations. It is not too late for
Congress to break with the practice of limiting testimony to that from politicians and toplayer
career bureaucrats—many with personal reputations to defend and institutional
equities to protect. Instead, use this unique opportunity to introduce salutary reform, an
opportunity that must not be squandered by politically driven haste.

Omission is one of the major flaws in the Commission’s report. We are aware of
significant issues and cases that were duly reported to the commission by those of us with
direct knowledge, but somehow escaped attention. Serious problems and shortcomings
within government agencies likewise were reported to the Commission but were not
included in the report. The report simply does not get at key problems within the
intelligence, aviation security, and law enforcement communities. The omission of such
serious and applicable issues and information by itself renders the report flawed, and
casts doubt on the validity of many of its recommendations.

We believe that one of the primary purposes of the Commission was to establish
accountability; that to do so is essential to understanding the failures that led to 9/11, and
to prescribe needed changes. However, the Commission in its report holds no one
accountable, stating instead “our aim has not been to assign individual blame”. That is to
play the political game, and it shows that the goal of achieving unanimity overrode one of
the primary purposes of this Commission’s establishment. When calling for
accountability, we are referring not to quasi-innocent mistakes caused by “lack of
imagination” or brought about by ordinary “human error”. Rather, we refer to intentional
actions or inaction by individuals responsible for our national security, actions or inaction
dictated by motives other than the security of the people of the United States.

The report deliberately ignores officials and civil servants who were, and still are, clearly negligent
and/or derelict in their duties to the nation. If these individuals are protected rather than
held accountable, the mindset that enabled 9/11 will persist, no matter how many layers
of bureaucracy are added, and no matter how much money is poured into the agencies.
Character counts. Personal integrity, courage, and professionalism make the difference.
Only a commission bent on holding no one responsible and reaching unanimity could
have missed that.

We understand, as do most Americans, that one of our greatest strengths in
defending against terrorism is the dedication and resourcefulness of those individuals
who work on the frontlines. Even before the Commission began its work, many honest
and patriotic individuals from various agencies came forward with information and
warnings regarding terrorism-related issues and serious problems within our intelligence
and aviation security agencies. If it were not for these individuals, much of what we
know today of significant issues and facts surrounding 9/11 would have remained in the
dark. These “whistleblowers” were able to put the safety of the American people above
their own careers and jobs, even though they had reason to suspect that the deck was
stacked against them. Sadly, it was. Retaliation took many forms: some were
ostracized; others were put under formal or informal gag orders; some were fired. The
commission has neither acknowledged their contribution nor faced up to the urgent need
to protect such patriots against retaliation by the many bureaucrats who tend to give
absolute priority to saving face and protecting their own careers.

The Commission did emphasize that barriers to the flow of information were a
primary cause for wasting opportunities to prevent the tragedy. But it skipped a basic
truth. Secrecy enforced by repression threatens national security as much as bureaucratic
turf fights. It sustains vulnerability to terrorism caused by government breakdowns.
Reforms will be paper tigers without a safe channel for whistleblowers to keep them
honest in practice. It is unrealistic to expect that government workers will defend the
public, if they can't defend themselves. Profiles in Courage are the exception, not the
rule. Unfortunately, current whistleblower rights are a cruel trap and magnet for
cynicism. The Whistleblower Protection Act has turned into an efficient way to finish
whistleblowers off by endorsing termination. No government workers have access to jury
trials like Congress enacted for corporate workers after the Enron/MCI debacles.

Government workers need genuine, enforceable rights just as much to protect America's
families, as corporate workers do to protect America's investments. It will take
congressional leadership to fill this hole in the 9/11 Commission's recommendations.
The Commission, with its incomplete report of “facts and circumstances”,
intentional avoidance of assigning accountability, and disregard for the knowledge,
expertise and experience of those who actually do the job, has now set about pressuring
our Congress and our nation to hastily implement all its recommendations. While we do
not intend to imply that all recommendations of this report are flawed, we assert that the
Commission’s list of recommendations does not include many urgently needed fixes, and
further, we argue that some of their recommendations, such as the creation of an
‘intelligence czar’, and haphazard increases in intelligence budgets, will lead to increases
in the complexity and confusion of an already complex and highly bureaucratic system.

Congress has been hearing not only from the commissioners but from a bevy of
other career politicians, very few of whom have worked in the intelligence community,
and from top-layer bureaucrats, many with vested interests in saving face and avoiding
accountability. Congress has not included the voices of the people working within the
intelligence and broader national security communities who deal with the real issues and
problems day-after-day and who possess the needed expertise and experience—in short,
those who not only do the job but are conscientious enough to stick their necks out in
pointing to the impediments they experience in trying to do it effectively.

We the undersigned, who have worked within various government agencies (FBI,
CIA, FAA, DIA, Customs) responsible for national security and public safety, call upon
you in Congress to include the voices of those with first-hand knowledge and expertise in
the important issues at hand. We stand ready to do our part.

Respectfully,

1. Castello, Edward J. Jr., Former Special Agent, FBI

2. Cole, John M., Former Veteran Intelligence Operations Specialist, FBI

3. Conrad, David "Mark", Retired Agent in Charge, Internal Affairs, U.S. Customs

4. Dew, Rosemary N., Former Supervisory Special Agent, Counterterrorism &
Counterintelligence, FBI

5. Dzakovic, Bogdan, Former Red Team Leader, FAA

6. Edmonds, Sibel D., Former Language Specialist, FBI

7. Elson, Steve, Retired Navy Seal & Former Special Agent, FAA & US Navy

8. Forbes, David, Aviation, Logistics and Govt. Security Analysts, BoydForbes, Inc.,

9. Goodman, Melvin A., Retired Senior Analyst/ Division Manager & senior fellow at the
Center for International Policy, CIA

10. Graf, Mark, Former Security Supervisor, Planner, & Derivative Classifier,
Department of Energy

11. Graham, Gilbert M., Retired Special Agent, Counterintelligence, FBI

12. Kleiman, Diane, Former Special Agent, US Customs

13. Kwiatkowski, Lt Col Karen U., Veteran Policy Analyst, USAF-DoD

14. Larkin, Lynne A., Former Operation Officer, CIA

15. MacMichael, David, Former Senior Estimates Officer, CIA

16. McGovern, Raymond L., Veteran Analyst, CIA

17. Pahle, Theodore J. Senior Intelligence Officer (Ret), Defense Intelligence Agency,
Office of Naval Intelligence, and U.S. Army Intelligence

18. Sarshar, Behrooz, Retired Language Specialist, FBI

19. Sullivan, Brian F., Retired Special Agent & Risk Management Specialist, FAA

20. Tortorich, Larry J., Retired US Naval Officer, US Navy & Dept. of Homeland
Security/TSA

21. Turner, Jane A., Retired Special Agent, FBI

22. Vincent, John B., Retired Special Agent, Counterterrorism, FBI

23. Whitehurst, Dr. Fred, Retired Supervisory Special Agent/Laboratory Forensic
Examiner, FBI

24. Wright, Col. Ann, Retired Reserve Colonel & Former US Diplomat, US Army,

25. Zipoli, Matthew J., Special Response Team (SRT) Officer, DOE

CC: Senate & House Intelligence Committees
Senate & House Judiciary Committees
Senate & House Armed Services Committees
Senate & House Government Reform Subcommittees

Link to this document: http://livingonenessfoundation.com/links/hsp-911commission-040913.pdf